Searching for the Stronger Form of War at the Operational Level in the 20th Century

Perhaps one of the most controversial theories proposed by the l9th century military theorist and historian, Carl von Clausewitz, was the proposition that the defense, not the offense, was the stronger form of war. This is the second of two monographs addressing this theoretical position with the first monograph dealing with the issue at the tactical level. Clausewitz vehemently promoted the theory of the superiority of the defense because he felt it was being unjustly degraded, berated, and neglected by misguided, offensive-minded militarists. In Book Six he offered various factors which he felt contributed the most to the outcome of any battle. Six factors were identified with three being common, though of varying value, to the tactical and operational (strategic) levels of war, while the last three were applicable only to the operational level of war. As previously stated in the first monograph the purpose of this study was not to redefine, manipulate, or submit any new criteria to determine which form of war is the stronger. Rather to use the model developed by Clausewitz and apply it to two examples of 20th century warfare at the operational level. The study confirmed that terrain, surprise, concentric attack, moral support, fortifications, and popular support certainly are essential factors in determining the outcome of a battle. The study also confirmed, however, that these and other factors (such as time and initiative) contributed directly to the outcome of a conflict proportional to the manner in which they were employed. Poorly utilized terrain resulted in the terrain contributing more to losing a conflict than winning it. So it is the defender's preparation, his use or misuse of these factors, which insures the success or failure of an operation. Defense is still inherently the stronger form of war at the operational level.